We study the hardness of approximation for the MINIMUM HACKING problem, which roughly can be described as the problem of finding the best way to compromise some target nodes given a few initial compromised nodes in a network. We give three reductions to show that MINIMUM HACKING is not approximable to within
Introduction
The MINIMUM COST HACKING problem (MIN-HACK for short), recently introduced in [4] , can roughly be described as the problem of finding an optimal method to hack into a set of target nodes given an initial set of compromised nodes of a network represented by a directed graph 8 . The graph 8 is referred to as the key challenge graph. For the hacker to traverse an edge 9 A @ C B E D G F I H Q P of the graph, the hacker has to pay some price. The edge 9 to be visited has a key challenge R T S such as some authentication data, or records in a database. If the hacker possesses the key R U S , then he only needs to pay a small price V W , otherwise he has to pay a larger price V Y X for traversing the edge. Each node H possesses some piece of informatioǹ B E H Q P , which might be a key to traverse some edge in the graph. Hence, the more number of nodes the hacker is able to hack into, the more keys (information) he possesses, and thus the more likely he will be able to hack into the rest of the nodes with lower cost.
The MIN-HACK problem has been shown to be a c b -hard in [4] . In this paper, we address the question of how hard it is to approximate MIN-HACK to within some ratio. We will show that MIN-HACK is not approximable to within d e 7 B g f h P p i ¦ @ r q t s v u x w y t g , where @ C X u x w y t u x w y 7
, for any V A 7 q . This negative result will be shown via three reductions, which are of independent interests, at least for pedagogical reason. The reductions are from MINIMUM LABEL COVER (MLC), from a PCP characterization of a b (mimicking an idea of Dinur and Safra [7] ), and from the MINIMUM MONOTONE SATISFYING ASSIGN-MENT (MMSA) problem. In fact, there is an hierarchy of MMSA numbered from MMSA , % @ C Y F q T F 0 7 7 Our reduction shows that MIN-HACK is on top of this hierarchy, namely for any 3 d f e ,
where g denote the relation "polynomially related approximation ratio." Although quite unlikely, if MIN-HACK can be approximated to within d e m B E f G P , then the hierarchy collapses. We have not been able to reduce any problem in "class e " to MIN-HACK. (Class e consists of problems with non-approximability ratio f o n like MAX-CLIQUE and COLORING [3] .) We also analyze the approximation ratios of some common-sense heuristics for this problem.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formally presents our problem and related background materials. Sections 3, 4, and 5 present three different reductions to show the hardness of MIN HACK. Section 6 gives our analysis of several Dijkstra's like heuristics for this problem.
Preliminaries

NP optimization problems, approximation algorithms, and approximation ratios
More detailed definitions and notations relating to optimization problems and approximation algorithms can be found in several books such as [8, 10, 11] . We briefly define related concepts here.
Following [5] , an NP optimization problem is a e -tuple B 
The MIN-HACK problem
In a recent paper [4] , we have devised a model for computer system vulnerability assessment. The model can roughly be described as follows.
An instance of the model is constructed by a security analyst who is aware of the computational infrastructure. Before formally defining the model, let us first motivate its formulation.
Any physical entity on which some information or capability can be acquired is represented as a vertex of a graph, which shall be called the key challenge graph. Let H be the set of vertices. Typically, vertices are points in the network where some information may be gained such as a database server or simply any computer system whose resources can be used or misused.
Each piece of information or capability present at any vertex H is represented as a key called`B E H Q P (or keyB g H Q P ). Let I denote the set of keys. For example, records in a database, passwords stored on a computer, or computational resources of a computer can be represented as keys. When an attacker visits a vertex, he is empowered with this additional information or capability.
If there is a channel of access or communication between two physical entities which facilitates interaction, then a directed edge is created between the two corresponding vertices, pointing to the direction of the allowed interaction. Multiple channels of communication are possible, hence there can be multiple edges between two vertices. Let be the set of edges.
The presence of a security measure or an enforced security policy protects the resources and allows only authorized interaction. This deterrence is represented as a key challenge on the corresponding channel of communication. An example of a key challenge is the password authentication required prior to accessing to a server.
If a user does not have the right key to the key challenge, then he incurs a significant cost in breaking or circumventing the security policy; legitimate access incurs only a smaller cost of meeting the key challenge. For example, when password authentication is used, if a user knows the password, he incurs little or no cost, while another user who doesn't know the password will incur a higher cost in breaking the password. The cost metric is a relative quantity signifying the amount of deterrence offered by one security measure over another. It has been abstracted as a non-negative integer for the purposes of our model. Figure 1 illustrates the building block of our model. The starting point of an attack could be one or more vertices in the graph, which are assumed to be initially compromised by the attacker. Let . An example of a target is a source code repository for a commercial product.
In what follows, we formalize the aforementioned concepts. is a function that assigns keys to vertices, i is a function that assigns key challenges and costs to edges.
Definition 2.1 (Key Challenge Graph
0 P implies an assignment of a key challenge to edge 9 t X , which requires an attacker to produce the key R X . If he cannot do so, then he incurs a cost V ¤ X ; otherwise, he incurs a smaller cost V m W . An adversary begins his attack at some point in the set of compromised nodes in the graph and proceeds by visiting more and more vertices until the target(s) is reached. At each visited vertex, the attacker adds the corresponding key to his collection of keys picked up at previous vertices. Once an attacker compromises a vertex, he continues to have control over it until the attack is completed. Therefore, any vertex appears exactly once in the attack description. While a trivial attack can be performed by visiting all reachable vertices until the target is reached, cost constraints occlude such free traversals. The next important aspect of the model is the cost metric. Although an attack is defined exclusively in terms of vertices, the cost incurred by the attacker at a vertex is mainly dependent on the edge that he chooses to visit the vertex. We first define the cost of traversing an edge and then the cost of visiting a new vertex. The latter is the basic unit of cost metric in our model. 
Definition 2.3 (Cost of Traversing an Edge). Let
, where R is some unique key no node has.
Definition 2.4 (Cost of Visiting a New Vertex). Define
H § ¦ as above. The cost of visiting a new vertex
The cost of an entire attack is measured as a sum of the effort required to compromise individual vertices by attempting to counter the key challenges on the edges with or without the keys that an attacker has already picked up.
Definition 2.5 (Cost of an attack). The cost of an attack
B g H Q X 0 F 7 0 7 7 F I H P is defined as:
where
The MIN-HACK problem is the problem of finding a minimum cost successful attack, given a key challenge graph.
The MINIMUM LABEL COVER$ (MLC$ ) problem
, an instance to the MLC$ problem consists of: 
. The MLC$ problem is to find a complete cover with minimum $ -cost. It is not necessary to assign more than one label to any vertex H
¥ H
. If a complete label cover assigns multiple labels to some vertex H ¥ ¦ H
, then the labeling obtained by removing all but one label from H is also a complete covering. Consequently, henceforth we can impose the condition that vertices in H get only one label each. Hardness results for this problem were devised in [2, 7, 9] . The current best result is that of [7] , which says that MLC$ is NP-hard to approximate to within B q s v u x w y 6 P , where
The MINIMUM MONOTONE SATISFYING ASSIGNMENT (MMSA) problem
A monotone boolean formula 0 is a boolean formula over the basis and has exactly two children, and each leaf is a boolean variable. The MINIMUM MONOTONE SATISFYING ASSIGNMENT (MMSA) was considered in [1] in relation to the problem of finding the length of a propositional proof. The MMSA problem is the problem of finding a truth assignment satisfying a monotone boolean formula which minimizes the number of TRUE variables. The problem was shown to be at least as hard as LABEL-COVER.
For each positive integer , MMSA is the restriction of MMSA to formulas of depth . For instance, MMSAh 's instances are monotone boolean formulas of the form AND of OR's of AND's. Following [7] , let g denote the relation "polynomially related approximation-ratio". The authors showed that, for all
3 Reducing MMSA to MIN-HACK We need to quote the following result from Dinur and Safra [7] .
Theorem 3.1. It is NP-hard to approximate MMSAh to within a ratio of
Thus, MMSA in general is not approximable to within d e B E f G P , assuming P 5 @ NP. We now describe a reduction from MMSA to MIN-HACK so that the approximation ratio is preserved (with a linear blow-up in input size).
Given a monotone boolean formula . The idea is that, getting to this node is the same as verifying that Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 3.2 and Theorem 3.1.
We now have an "upper bound" for the hierarchy of MMSA mentioned in relation (3):
Consequently, if MIN-HACK is approximable to within (some constant times) d t e m B E f G P , then the hierarchy collapses after MMSAj .
Reducing LABEL-COVER to MIN-HACK
In this section, we present a reduction from MLCX to MIN-HACK which preserves the approximation ratio. Since MLCX was shown to be not approximable to within d e m B E f G P for any V 7 q (unless P = NP) [7] , this reduction gives another proof of the hardness result for MIN-HACK.
Consider an instance of MLCX consisting of a bipartite graph . Abusing notation, we shall also use the name of a node to denote the key it possesses. (Nodes in our reduction will have different keys.)
We first define the vertices in the label acquisition component (see Figure 6 ). There is a vertex consists of the following vertices (see Figure 7) : 
Reducing PCP to MIN-HACK
In this section, we give a direct proof that MIN-HACK is not approximable to within d U e 7 B g f h P for any V m q by using a PCP characterization of NP with almost polynomially small error probability [6] . This PCP characterization can be summarized in the following theorem, which we quote from [7] . The general strategy to prove a hardness result for MIN-HACK is to show that if the MIN-HACK is approximable to within a certain ratio, then it is possible to distinguish between the YES and the NO instances of the boolean constraint satisfaction problem mentioned in Theorem 5.1. The idea is to find a "gap-preserving" reduction from ¡ to an instance of MIN-HACK. We shall follow the line of Dinur and Safra [7] . The following reduction shows that the three problems MLC$ , MMSA, and MIN-HACK are closely related.
Suppose we are given an instance To get to H , the attacker can then get through the components of the . Hence, the cost of the entire attack is
Consider the probability distribution on where every elements of are chosen by first uniformly choose a constraint ). The lower bounds on the approximation ratios hold for the general case, nevertheless.
The first obvious idea is to mimic Dijkstra's algorithm for the $ -( shortest path problem. We start with a set
, and keep adding into ¦ the cheapest possible vertex we can reach (using both the cost function and the combination of keys we get so far). In the process, each newly added vertex H has information about which sequence of vertices was used to get to Proof. This modified heuristic will be able to detect a cost 1 attack to ( . However, it will not be able to detect that there might be a small cost "sacrifice" we can make.
Consider the example build as in the previous proposition. The only difference is that the V W -cost of @ B E f 7 P 0 B E f q ¤ P 7 0 m B E f R Q P combinations of ways to get from H , the radius R can only be a constant for the algorithm to have polynomial running time. The same conclusion holds about the exponential approximation ratio. We simply put vertex H T X in the example above at a distance R from $ .
